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Any theodicy is often fraught with difficulties. The two major families identified are
Augustinian theodicy and Irenaean theodicy, named after these two early church
fathers. These two perspectives are widely accepted accounts of theodicy and
represent a general theological approach to the problem of evil. We will explore the
insufficiency of these perspectives in light of evolutionary considerations and, in the
end, disappointingly, call for an as yet developed theodicy to be offered.
God … either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is
unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is
willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character
of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with
God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore
not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what
source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?
Epicurus, as quoted by Lactantius1
The presence of evil and suffering in the
world has presented theists with an enduring
problem. Clear tension, if not outright
contradiction, stands between the existence
of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and
the existence of natural evil particularly in
the case of gratuitous suffering. Moral evil
we can blame on ourselves, although
doctrines like original sin are not all that
helpful.2 Over the past two millennia, many
Christian thinkers have thought it necessary
to provide a logical account for evil within
the Christian faith and have thus taken up
the task of developing a satisfactory
theodicy. From many proposed
formulations, two major families identified
by theologian John Hick3 have emerged and
remain influential today: Augustinian
theodicy and Irenaean theodicy. While both
of these perspectives are born out of the
writings of these two early church fathers,

both have been carried into contemporary
thought and received modern treatments and
formulations. These two perspectives are
thought to comprise the most organized and
widely accepted accounts of theodicy within
the Christian schema; they represent a
general theological approach to the problem
of evil in modern times. We will explore the
insufficiency of these perspectives in light of
modern science and, in the end, they still
disappointingly call for an as yet developed
theodicy to be offered.
In the past century and a half, scientific
explanation has answered more questions
and its application has resolved many
intractable problems. The science behind the
observation of evolution, the theory of
natural selection, has come to be accepted as
a principal concept within this currently held
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scientific view.4 Through intense scrutiny
and study, Darwin’s model of evolution by
natural selection has emerged as an
incredibly helpful insight into the living
world and is now a foundational premise in
both the natural and social sciences.
Unfortunately, the development of the
Darwinian worldview has met significant
opposition from many Christian
fundamentalists. The ideas of natural
selection and modification by descent from a
common ancestor complicate traditional
interpretations of scripture. Among the
many issues that would need to be
thoroughly reexamined is the Christian
approach to theodicy.
Therefore, I will examine the challenges that
evolutionary thought presents for the
Augustinian and Irenaean perspectives on
theodicy. Each perspective will be briefly
represented in its currently relevant form
and then examined in light of Darwinism.
The evolutionary perspective takes seriously
the processes that start with a common
ancestor and display increasing
diversification of living organisms across
successive generations through heritable
changes in the genome and its expression,
coupled with natural selection – the
tendency for changes that prove
advantageous for survival and sustainable
reproduction in a given environment will be
preserved. This definition is well within the
widely accepted tenets of evolution as
conceived by Darwin and his successors. I
will strive to avoid scientific reductionism;
instead, I shall look through the lens of
evolution and examine an important element
of Christian thought in order to observe the
points of contention which require further
development in hopes of resolution.
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Augustinian Theodicy
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) remains
one of the more prominent and influential
early Christian theologians. He is credited
with laying the groundwork for the first of
the two considered theodicies. His magnum
opus, City of God, lays out a sophisticated
organization of reflections regarding the
origin and nature of evils and their
relationship to a Christian Lord and Creator.
His perspective was carried on and further
revised by a number of Western theists
including Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin.
His formulation is recognizable today in a
variety of versions, but is perhaps most
prominent in the free will defense of Alvin
Plantinga; sadly, his argument stops short
and merely asserts that the argument is not
logically incoherent.
Augustine’s theodicy approaches the task of
reconciling an omniscient, omnipotent,
benevolent God and the existence of evil by
primarily looking to the origin and nature of
humanity. Augustine affirms that everything
the Creator creates is good; indeed, it is
perfect.5 However, humanity is created
possessing volition, the ability to freely
choose right and wrong thinking and see it
through to action.6 Augustine posits that
since all things are created good, and since it
follows that their nature is good, evil does
not exist as an entity in and of itself. Evil is,
rather, the privation of good.7 Augustine
holds that though all things were created
good, including humanity, the free choice of
Adam to disobey the will of God introduced
a misuse of the created good, enacting a
necessary potential in human freedom:
namely, the freedom to depart from the good
will of a benevolent Creator. Put another
way, the onus for evil in the world does not
lie with God, but with humanity. This
6
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fundamental theological position has come
to be known among Christians as The Fall.
Augustine therefore makes allowance for the
evils that we witness as just punishment for
the actions taken through Adam and which
affect us all. Augustine holds that through
the grace of God and confession of Jesus
Christ as the perfect incarnation and
sacrifice, the sin might be accounted for and
the confessor, upon death, can resume his
position as one who does not sin.
This brief reflection brings to light several
key elements in Augustine’s theodicy. First,
it is clearly of tantamount importance to
Augustine that a perfect God cannot be held
responsible for evil; through the sin of
Adam, humanity bears full responsibility.
Secondly, it is clear that free will is a
necessary condition of Adam, otherwise his
transgression could not be considered sin,
and God would again be culpable.8 Thirdly,
if the original sin is what ushered in evil and
death, then there is a period prior to this
event in which there was no evil and
presumably no suffering or death.

analysis of the process of natural selection
elucidates a deeper incompatibility in these
two views. If natural selection is indeed
viewed as the mechanism by which genes
are generationally transmitted (driven by the
selective pressures within nature including
competition for limited resources and mates,
ability to avoid predation, and suitability to
endure harsh conditions), then these natural
evils have served as selective conditions
presumably from the origin of life. Unless
the action of Adam is thought to have some
kind of retroactive effect upon the creation,
it is not readily apparent how the free action
of a man can be upheld as the cause of
natural evils such as death and suffering,
and extinction, in animals.

Examined from the perspective of
evolutionary thought, Augustinian theodicy
seems to suffer on its own premises. When
the Augustinian theologian begins with a
critique of the advent of evil through an
action of humans, she must account for why
there appears in the natural world such
suffering, pain, death and struggle even
before humankind comes into existence …
some of which, at least in human eyes,
seems gratuitous and unnecessary. As
Arvind Sharma points out, distinct,
recognizable vectors such as disease and
natural disaster long preceded human
existence.9 In truth, apart from discrete
causes of suffering, pain, and what has been
referred to as the natural evils, a brief

In addition to this difficulty, the Augustinian
theodicy also assumes that a rational and
volitional decision was made to rebel against
the will of God through Adam. If the notion
of evolutionary descent of all life from a
common ancestor is upheld, and humans
developed by degrees through the
mammalian line to the hominids we
currently are, then it becomes difficult to pin
down when exactly such a monumental
decision might have taken place. At what
point in our development could humanity be
held as a free moral agent in the mind of a
Creator? Alternatively, if ‘original sin’ does
not take the form of a single incident of a
single man, but rather the collective trend of
actions of a developing species, what set or
trend would be considered? Could original
sin be no more than any selfish action that
prohibits fecundity in any other species?
Evil is what interrupts new creation. Perhaps
eating of the forbidden fruit was the
metaphorical idea of destroying the very life
processes that God had ordained as sacred.
We have been given so much fruitfulness
already, why do we also have to greedily
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take that from which we are asked to refrain.
At what point in the evolutionary history of
hominids can we settle on for the event(s)
that determined when and how humanity
departed from the will of God?
When these considerations are combined, it
becomes clear that the Augustinian line of
theodicy is faced with problems in
defending the premise that humanity is
clearly to blame for the presence of natural
evil in the world, a central premise to the
integrity of Augustine’s argument.10
Irenaean Theodicy
Irenaeus, the 2nd century bishop of
Lugdunum, and Origen of Alexandria are
credited with the foundational principle of
the second of school of theodicy considered;
it bears the name of the former church
father. While Augustine’s theodicy was
favored in the Roman Catholic Church and
most of western Protestantism with
medieval and renaissance theists being
strongly affected by it, Irenaean thinking
proved more influential in the Eastern
Orthodox tradition but made a resurgence in
popularity with German theists Gottfried
Leibniz (1646-1716) and Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Leibniz
borrowed from Irenaean thought to develop
an optimism theodicy (as in optimal world).
Schleiermacher and the more notable
contemporary proponent, John Hick (19222012), organized the previous writings into
the Augustinian and Irenaean families; Hick
went on to formulate his own sophisticated,

10

This critique is in addition to the devastating one
against Augustine’s illogic in his argument where
Brannan (2007), referencing F. LeRon Shults (2003),
asks, “If they [Adam and Eve] were perfectly wise,
why were they misled? If they were created foolish
(and since folly is the greatest of the vices), why is
God the author of vice? We can counter that it was
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still does not get our conception of God off the hook.
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Irenaean-influenced theodicy by
incorporating Darwinian thought.
The Irenaean approach to theodicy differs
from the Augustinian on several important
points. While Augustinian thinkers attempt
to argue that God is not responsible for the
creation and existence of evil, the Irenaean
line claims that God is indeed responsible
and justified for the allowance of the
existence of evil. Irenaean theodicy uses
different approaches to argue that an
omnipotent, benevolent Creator would
create an ideal (not perfect without death
and suffering) world to serve the purposes of
the Creator. Thus, it follows that if evil
exists, it exists to serve a purpose or
multiple purposes in the ultimate designs of
God, traditionally referred to as the “best of
all possible worlds” argument (optimism).
Essential to this line of thinking is the
assertion that the creation of man in the
image and likeness of God was not an
instantaneous action in a time gone by, but a
continuing process that progresses
throughout the life and experiences of the
individual and species as a whole. The
Irenaean approach holds that mankind is not
the once perfect, now broken product of a
discrete creation action, but rather the
continuing creation and, in the mind of some
Irenaean scholars, co-contributor in the
ultimate product. This retains the importance
of free will for each individual and also
attempts to make room for evil as a
necessary condition for the continued
creation of humanity into God’s likeness.
Origin refers to the concept as something
It just pushes the objection back a step or postulates
that God pre‐destined Satan’s sinful act and Adam’s
disobedience; or we become victim to Manichean
thought. Augustine, like so many others, begs the
question with the claim that it is an incomprehensible
mystery.” (p. 191). Even Augustine admits his illogic
with the claim of “incomprehensible mystery.”
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akin to a school of the soul, while John
Hicks prefers the term “soul-making
theodicy”11. This continued creation of the
soul then leads up to and is fully realized in
the parousia of scripture and reunion with
God. Irenaean theodicy holds that if these
two considerations (purpose of evil and
continuing creation) are correct, then there is
no logical or evidential problem with the
simultaneous existence of evil and an all
powerful, all loving God.
Naturally, this position is not without
criticism. Fyodor Dostoyevski portrays a
withering critique of this position in his
famous dialogue “Rebellion,” portraying it
as a heartless and unthinkable calculation for
a loving God.12 A number of theologians
and philosophers have been quick to point
out that the Irenaean theodicy appears to
feature a paradoxical God who, although
omnibenevolent, is imposing natural pain
and suffering (including, what seem to
some, gratuitous ‘evils’) to achieve his own
ends. Nevertheless, this theodicy has had
considerable success in the modern era
creating a logical account for evil. As one
might suspect from a post-Darwinian writer,
John Hicks makes an admirable effort in
accounting for the scientific account of
evolution in his writings. As a fruit of these
efforts, Irenaean theodicy seems to suffer
less criticism from a Darwinian perspective.
However, there are still points of tension.
Eleanor Stump points out that if the entire
place for evil is in the continuing formation
of the soul of individuals, it does not appear
to account for the suffering of those with
debilitating disabilities, terminal illnesses
and other conditions that are very difficult to
11
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perceive as formative.13 This argument can
be expanded to a multitude of easily
imaginable cases: an infant who has died of
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), an
individual born with a genetic disability that
severely limits her physical and mental
capacity, or any number of other
unnecessary maladies. While it may appear
possible to account for pain, suffering, and
evil in the larger, theoretical picture, the
theodicy appears to have much less
explanatory power against specific
instances; this specificity is partially of why
Dostoyevsky’s critique has such enduring
strength.
Also, as Christopher Southgate notices, the
Irenaean theodicy fails to account for the
suffering of animals and, thus, what is called
natural evil.14 While this problem is neatly
avoided in the Augustinian position by
attributing natural evils such as animal
suffering (along with humanity’s) to the sin
of mankind due to the fall, Irenaean
approaches see gratuitous animal suffering
and our own as an opportunity for
developing the soul in the best of possible
worlds where freedom is valued regardless
of agony. Following this logic, if animals
cannot be thought to have a soul comparable
to that of humans,15 then it is not readily
apparent for what purpose they suffer,
unless it can be totally accounted for by
some soul-making utility for humanity such
as the cultivation of sympathy or
compassion. If this latter position is the case,
the Irenaean view is problematic from a
Darwinian perspective – it fails to account
for the suffering of all life past and present
over billions of years when no humans had
15

This claim, in fact, is likely incorrect as nephesh
(or nepes) in Hebrew is used for both humans and
animals. One is likely to make more progress by
considering the difference between God’s image
versus His likeness, as Irenaeus does, but the
discussion is more involved than can be had here.

30

Theodicy and Darwin
even yet appeared. The rigors of natural
selection and gratuitous extinctions seem to
magnify suffering and death beyond what is
needed for humanity to arrive and survive.
Southgate seeks denouement of this
conundrum by embedding Irenaean thought
into an evolutionary perspective by
affirming the teleological worth of the
animal life, but his argument suffers a
similar flaw as does the larger Irenaean
framework in addressing particular
instances. For example, what possible “soulmaking” telos does a non-living parasitic
virus possess? Irenaean theodicy appears to
be lacking explanatory power in light of the
Darwinian processes of modification by
descent from a common ancestor.
Conclusion
If a system of thought is to be accepted, it
must not only address the problems that are
readily apparent at the time of conception
but also the issues that arise when newly

accepted information is applied. If there is a
contradiction, the necessary logical task of
those who accept the ideas must be to
reexamine the position and either revise or
reject it. This is the position of the theist
who accepts evolution today. The purpose of
this brief essay is merely to accomplish the
recognition that our existing approaches to
account for gratuitous natural evil and
suffering do not appear sufficient in light of
the evidence supplied by the theory of
evolution.16 The harsh glare of Darwinian
thought reveals a need for new renderings of
theodicy.
Perhaps if we explore process or open
theology where God empties Himself
(Herself?) of power to enable sentience to
evolve without interference – co-creators
with the image and likeness of God who are
expected to solve the problems of evil –
perhaps then we may develop more fruitful
hypotheses. I leave that for others to
develop.
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Our concern was in making sense of natural evil,
disasters and diseases that seem not to have any
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features or functions other than causing gratuitous
suffering in even non-human creatures.
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